Fühlunghalter
1. Definition of “Fühlunghalter procedure”
The term “Fühlunghalter procedure” is used in this report to signify a form of shadowing in which aircraft, on locating a moving target, transmit W/T signals in such a way that further aircraft can guide themselves to the target by taking D/F bearings on this transmission. The “ Fühlunghalter” is the aircraft used for this purpose.
2. Frequency and W/T Procedure
Like other German medium frequency D/F stations, shadowing aircraft use frequencies from the 300-600 Kcs. Band. The frequency is not constant, and there is evidence to suggest that in the Mediterranean (and othe rareas) frequencies are alloted on the basis of some kind of rota.
The aircraft transmits D/F signals (AAAs or VVVs) interspersed with his H/F tactical call-sign.
3. Operations.
Fühlunghalter procedure is only suitable to a certain type of operation. An analysis of recent operations during which it has been used shows that they are organised on the following plan:-
a) Preliminary reconnaissance
Information is received from aircraft on routine reconnaissance flights or from other intelligence sources (in particular the German “Y” service) that a suitable target is at sea (generally a sortie by the naval units) and its approximate position is established, if necessary by means of a further reconnaissance flight by aircraft, using visual observation.
b) Fühlunghalter tactics
Fühlunghalter aircraft are then despatched, each keeping contact with the target and sending D/F signals until he is relived by a second over or until the main force has found the target.
c) The attack and Wirkungserkundung
While the attack is taking place, the Fühlunghalter remains over the target to act as “Wirkungserkundung”, i.e. to carry out visual and photo reconnaissance of results.
4. Type of Target
Owing to the fact that the application of this procedure requires detailed preparation some time in advance, it has only been employed for large-scale attacks by aircraft from several units against a target of major importance...usually a large naval formation. In practice it has most frequently been employed when an attempt to run an axis is being made and counter operations by the Mediterranean Fleet is feared.
5. Importance of the Fühlunghalter
The functions of the Fühlunghalter are:-
a) Maintenance of contact with the target:
The importance of this function arises:
b) Wirkungserkundung
The Command relies on the reports of this aircraft in assessing the results of the operations (see para 3(c)).
6. Aircraft Deployed
a) Preliminary reconnaissance
This is generally done by any available aircraft capable of routine sea reconnaissance (cf. Para. 10 when Reconnaissance Gruppe used aircraft of II./KG 26 for this purpose).
b) Fühlunghalter
Because of its vital importance to the operation, this is considered to be a job for specialist crews. The Command usually prefers to hold back the Fühlunghalter machines until the approximate locatrion of the target has been established. (cf. Para. 10 the aircraft of II./KG 26 (cf. (a). above) carried out reconnaissance from dawn, but the Fühlunghalter machines, which belonged to the reconnaissance gruppe itself, did not take off until 09.00 hrs GMT)
7. Factors affecting success of Fühlunghalter procedure.
The following factors have been responsible for the failure of the Fühlunghalter to carry out his mission:-
a) Petrol shortage
b) Technical trouble
c) Approach of darkness
d) Damage to aircraft or W/T apparatus by A/A Fire
e) Fighter Defence
8. An unsuccessful operations
For the operation on 14/12/41 (to ensure the passage of an Axis convoy to North Africa) the following preparations were made:-
On 13/12/41
On 14/12/41
On the morning of 14/12, II./KG 26 covered the area as far as 24° East and an additional 6 aircraft of II./LG 1 the area east of 24° East as far as the line Rhodes-Rosetta Mouth(possibly because the Germans did not trust the Italians to cover this area satisfactorily.
Italian aircraft first sighted 3 battleships and 9 destroyers at 08.05 hrs GMT in 23 East 64 (the degree square 26-27 East, 33-34 North) and II./LG 1 on preliminary reconnaissance, contacted the same formation at 10.30 hrs GMT in 23 East 54 (the degree square 25-26 East, 33-34 North).
The Fühlunghalter aircraft had now taken off. (apparently on the Italian sighting report), and shadowed the naval force during the morning while a combined bomber and torpedo-bomber force was prepared by II./KG 26 (He 111s) and I./LG 1 (Ju 88s). Twelve aircraft of II./KG 26 were despatched from Greece at 12.25 and fifteen from I./LG 1 from North Africa at about the same time. While they were still on the way out, the second Fühlunghalter went too near the target, possibly in order to take photographs, and had his W/T transmitter damaged by AA fire.
The aircraft which were approaching the target from north and south were deprived of their D/F signals; of the 27 aircraft projected, only four found the target, and the operation was accounted a failure. Moreover no second sortie was undertaken.
9. A successful operations
A similar operation on 17/12 was organised, as far as the preliminary reconnaissance and Fühlunghalter are concerned, on the same lines as the operation on 14/12.
On 16/12 a large naval formation was sighted off Sidi Barrani. Aircraft of II./KG 26 on preliminary reconnaissance sighted the formation at 0714 on 17/12 in 23 East 0586 (34.10-15 North, 20.50-2100 East). The first aircraft of Recce Gruppe took over shadowing (Fühlunghalter) duties at about 1030, and landed at 1512; a second aircraft took of to relieve the first Fühlunghalter at 1213, and remained over the formation until 1515, when he was forced to return owing to lack of fuel. During the period in which he acted as Fühlunghalter, attacks were made by two waves of LG 1 as well as by four aircraft carrying torpedos, all aircraft who set out finding their objective.
Distribution
| Copy No1 | Group Captain Cadell, D.D.I.4 |
| 2,3 | A.I. 3(b) |
| 4 | O.C. Cheadle |
| 5. | D.D.I.C |
| And 8 | File copies |
From FAGr 5 RL10/366
15.12.1943
Extract from Erfahrungen aus dem Einsatz der F.A.G. 5 vom 15.11. ~15. 12.44
Fühlunghalten
The most difficult task for the reconnaissance pilot is, without doubt, maintaining contact and transmitting direction-finding signals whilst keeping contact with the convoy. When transmitting direction-finding signals, the entire defence focuses on the single reconnaissance aircraft, which acts as a flying radio beacon.
The new order regarding the transmission of direction-finding signals brings some relief, but still poses an extremely serious risk to the aircraft maintaining contact.
Maintaining contact whilst under cloud cover and at night is feasible in the manner prescribed; in conditions of light cloud cover or clear weather, it is only possible in the prescribed manner when flying in a flight or in a chain formation, in order to increase defensive strength.
To make the contact pilot’s task easier, other means must be found to signal the convoy’s position: increased use of ‘Schwan-See’ and similar devices, as well as optical aids at night (parachute flares, Lux lights, etc.).